If Nostalgia Is a Desire, What Does It Long For?

When we’re not using nostalgia as a term of derision, we use it to name a twinge in the gut that somehow blends melancholic longing with happy recollection. When this experience becomes acute it may best be described, pardon the unseemly melodrama, as an ache in the soul, but one that is not without its consolations.

But first, about that derisiveness. Nostalgia is a fighting word. For instance, one of the easiest ways to dismiss a claim is to label it nostalgic. This is why, in fact, I’m thinking of adding “knee-jerk recourse to nostalgia as a term of derision” to the list of Borg Complex symptoms. No doubt, much of what gets labeled nostalgic should be dismissed, although perhaps not simply by attaching a label to it. At best, then, we allow ourselves to indulge in the distractions of nostalgia–a little Mad Men, a little Downton–so long as we maintain the appropriate degree of ironic detachment.

I remain curious, though, about the feeling itself and what evokes it. It is one thing to critically analyze the commodification of nostalgia and its deployment as a marketing tool, for example, and it is another thing to contemplate that moment when we experience the feeling we label nostalgia, particularly in its more acute manifestations, and seek its sources.

Tintern Abbey, JMW Turner, 1794. Wikimedia Commons.
Tintern Abbey, JMW Turner, 1794. Wikimedia Commons.

Part of what puzzles me about such experiences is how difficult it is , for me at least, to define what exactly one is feeling. But before I go any further, it might be useful for you to recall for yourself a time when you experienced nostalgia. I don’t assume that everyone has had such an experience, but, if you have, try to hold that moment in mind and think with me about how we might understand it. Here are a few lightly structured thoughts toward that end.

The thing that arouses nostalgia is a synecdoche for the past and a signal of our dislocation; it is a reminder of our finitude, for we cannot horde time.

But is nostalgia for the past? We know that nostalgia was originally a word that described intense homesickness, but today we think of it more as a longing for a time rather than a place. So which is it? Is it really or always “pastness” that evokes the feeling we call nostalgia? I wonder, too, if these are not always present together. I think of Wordsworth’s “Lines Written a Few Miles above Tintern Abbey,” which begins with

“Five years have past; five summers, with the length
Of five long winters!”

and continues by describing the place around the abbey. It would be hard to abstract, in more than a theoretical way, the aspects of time and place from Wordsworth’s nostalgic meditations.

Maybe it is really neither place nor time that is the essence of the experience of nostalgia. Maybe place and time have been proxies for some other object of desire whose presence radiates from  them and through our memory to us.

Nostalgia, then, is just another word for desire, or, perhaps better, it is one of the shapes desire takes. That’s what gives it its ache-in-the-soul quality. But what is it a longing for, if not for a time or for a place?

Wordsworth gives us a hint when he notes that he was

“changed, no doubt, from what I was when first
I came among these hills.”

I am scattered through time, as are you. One way of thinking about the divided, de-centered, shattered self is to see it as a temporal phenomenon, as a function of our time-stretched nature. I have been; I am; I will be. The self may feel most coherent in the present moment, on the leading edge of time, but it is scattered throughout the past.

We can imagine it as a boat and its wake. Seen from above, the wake is widest, and most diffuse, at its farthest from the boat. We are that boat making its way inexorably onward on the sea of time, but we are also the wake with the detritus of the self strewn upon it.

Nostalgia, from this perspective, is a desire for the self, for self-possession, for all of the selves we have been. The desire is kindled when our present self tunes in to traces of our past self. That tuning might be occasioned by an object, an image, a melody, a smell, and, yes, a place. But it is not any of those things which we desire, it is that part of our self that existed with them. The objects and experiences that evoke nostalgia are synecdoches not for a time but for the self.

Nostalgia then is ultimately a desire for wholeness. It is a desire to horde, not time, but rather the fullness of our self, scattered across time; a desire to lose nothing of our selves, to hold, at once, all that we have been. That, of course, is an impossible object of desire, which is why nostalgia vocalized is a sigh.

But Wordsworth once more:

“That time is past,
And all its aching joys are now no more,
And all its dizzy raptures. Not for this
Faint I, nor mourn nor murmur; other gifts
Have followed; for such loss, I would believe,
Abundant recompense.”

______________________________

Further reading:

Consuming Traditions: Modernity, Modernism, and the Commodified Authentic 

The True and Only Heaven: Progress and Its Critics

Feenberg’s Rational Critique of Rationality

In his attempt to work out a “rational critique of rationality,” philosopher Andrew Feenberg blends Frankfurt School critical theory with science and technology studies and a sprinkling of Weberian rationalization theory. The result is the articulation of a framework for understanding structural similarities among the development of technology, technological systems, and systems of rationality.

The concept of instrumentalization plays a crucial role in Feenberg’s critique. Here Feenberg describes the initial stage of instrumentalization:

“The initial insight that opens up an object to incorporation into a rational system presupposes two conceptual operations. First the object must be decontextualized, split off from its original environment. And second, it must be reduced or simplified to bring to prominence just those aspects that can be functionalized in terms of a goal. These operations describe the original imaginative relation to the world in which affordances are identified that expose objects and persons to technization, commodification, and bureaucratic control. This vision plays out in actions that exhibit a decontextualizing and reductive aspect. For example, a tree in the forest is situated in a specific place and an ecological niche but to become lumber it must be removed and stripped of its complex connections to other living things and the earth. A person enters the purview of a bureaucracy as a ‘case,’ abstracted from the totality of a life process and simplified of extraneous elements. Goods become commodities through an interpretation which strips them bare of human connections and throws them into circulation. ‘In short, rationalization might be defined as the destruction or ignoring of information in order to facilitate its processing’ (Benziger, 1986: 15).”

What has been abstracted and decontextualized must then be reintegrated:

“Before it can be developed as a working artifact, the decontextualized object must be placed in the context of pre-existing devices and systems. ‘Systematization,’ as I call this process, links the artifact or system to its technical and natural environment, for example, to the prevailing electrical voltage and weather conditions. In addition, the reductions it has undergone must be compensated by new mediations drawn from the ethical and aesthetic registers of the society in which it is to function. Legal, moral, and aesthetic constraints intervene in the design and production process, determining an artifact capable of entering a specific social world.”

Feenberg describes these two stages as primary and secondary instrumentalization. You can read the whole article here: “From Critical Theory of Technology to the Rational Critique of Rationality.”

Two Introverts On The Internet

Paul Fidalgo wonders about the relationship between extroversion and the disconnectionists, the label he borrows from Nathan Jurgenson for those who advocate periods of disconnection from the Internet. Like Jurgenson, Fidalgo is annoyed by what he takes to be the self-righteous tone of the disconnectionists, but he also links his complaint to the opportunities for expression the Internet offers introverts like himself:

Online I’ve found a taste of liberation. Not only do I feel more free to expound upon all manner of subjects, to make dumb jokes, and to promote myself with a sincerity I could never muster in meatspace, but perhaps more importantly, I more often feel at ease in simply explaining things about myself as a person, to talk about my kids and my day-to-day life, to unpack some of the mundane stuff as well as the heavier things. Behind the screen, at the keyboard, at the flick of the scrolling display, even in the midst of the cacophony of the Internet, I can communicate without so much of the same noise within my own mind, where each synapse second-guesses the next.

I can relate to Fidalgo’s introversion, and I can understand where Fidalgo’s is coming from when he raises the following possibility in his conclusion:

I’d be curious to know whether many or most of the folks who espouse disconnection are extroverts, if they are biased by their own inclination toward revitalization through in-person human contact, all within a “real world” already largely constructed around extroverted predilections. If I’m on to something, well then of course they see the online life as valueless, or as phony. It doesn’t serve their own needs. But for me, and I suspect for my kind, the Web is the means of expression, the gateway into general society, that we’ve been waiting for. We’re damn lucky it came about it our lifetimes, and you better believe that for us, it’s real life.

Well, I can offer myself to Fidalgo as one point of anecdotal evidence: I espouse certain forms of disconnection, and I am decidedly not an extrovert. Without calling Fidalgo’s experience into question, I’ve sometimes felt that my disconnectionist impulses stemmed in part from my own introversion. I’ve also linked my inability to be at ease on Twitter directly to my introversion. That is to say, I sometimes find using Twitter to be as draining an experience as navigating a crowded and unfamiliar social setting.

Again, this is not to discount or challenge Fidalgo’s experience; it’s only to offer a contrasting one.

Perhaps talk of introversion and extroversion, conceptually fuzzy categories to begin with is not the only or best way of describing whatever dynamic is at play here. Zeynep Tufekci , for instance, invites us to consider the possibility of a condition she calls cyberasociality:

It remains a possibility that there are people for whom text is unable to evoke the same deep reaction embodied physically co-present interaction arouses. Such an inability, or an unwillingness, could be seen akin to another modern ailment, that of dyslexia (Wolf, 2007). The ability to convert alphabetical symbols to words, and then to seamlessly convert those words into meanings, is one of the more remarkable feats of the human brain and is mastered by most who are given persistent and competent instruction. However, for some segment of the population, this leap may remain unattainable and pose great difficulty even though the person in question may not suffer from any other disadvantage such as technological incompetence or inability or fear of using computers for instrumental purposes.

Whatever causes dyslexia, it would not have been detectable in a pre-literate population as among such people, words are always and only just sounds. In fact, linguists often caution against our tendency to equate words with letters and remind us that language is primarily aural and the transition to visual language is a late development. (Ong, 2004). Dyslexia emerges as a disadvantage only as a society incorporates the ease of use of the written word into the expected competencies into its portfolio, similarly, the increasing incorporation of online-sociality may expose a segment of the population that is similarly disadvantaged from being able to use these technologies as effectively as others.

Thus, conceptually, I propose a modern condition, named cyberasociality, which represents the possibility that some segment of the population remain unable or unwilling to relate to others via social media as they do when physically-present; and that this is not necessarily related to their general levels of sociality or to their competence with or use of computers or similar digital devices.

It seems to me that Tufekci is on to something important. In any case, I’m not sure why we would privilege either connection or disconnection in abstraction. Decisions about Internet use should be responsive to any number of shifting internal and external variables. While negotiating digital culture, it seems best to keep all options on the table, including the practice of disconnection … sans self-righteousness, of course.

“Of course” It Rarely Is

We half-consciously navigate our way through life by the light of what we take for granted, by beliefs that, if articulated, would be prefaced with “of course.”

“Of course, the world is this way.”

“Of course, people are this way.”

“Of course, I am this way.”

But where do these “of course” assumptions come from? Their force, their compelling “of course” status, is proportionally related to the difficulty of answering this question. Actually, their force derives from the unlikelihood of our ever even formulating the question in the first place. We do not ordinarily think about these assumptions, we think with them. 

These “of course” assumptions are rooted in the shadowy borderland between conscious and unconscious thought. They were, for the most part, formed in childhood and we were unaware that they were taking shape.They envelop us. 

Occasionally though, their contours appear to us fleetingly, like the outlines of a cloud that becomes visible at night when it is shot through with lightning. That flash of insight may be just enough to quicken our imagination, weaken the hold of the “of course,” and illuminate new possibilities. Such intellectual flashes are among the great pleasures of the life of the mind, even though they may sometimes mingle terror with their beauty. 

We cannot do without the assumptions that structure thought. We cannot, in other words, imagine the world anew each time that we try to think at all. But it is good to remember, for humility’s sake, that our assumptions are there, like the unseen cloud against the night sky, unseen yet shaping what we see. And we should welcome the lightning when it strikes.

Rethinking My Online Presence for 2014

A couple of weeks ago, more or less, I stumbled on a post by Matt Mullenweg in which he discussed the seemingly arbitrary logic governing what gets a lot of attention online. Work really hard on a piece that wrestles with something you think is important, he notes, and you may end up getting a trickle of attention. Post something offhand on a whim, and it may get a ton of exposure.

In his view, there are two unhealthy responses to this state of affairs. One is to despair and stop writing. The other is “to deconstruct the elements of what makes something sharable and attempt to artificially construct these information carbohydrates over and over.”

The third way that Mullenweg offers is to write for two people. Write for yourself and write for “a single person who you have in mind as the perfect person to read what you write.”

That’s not bad advice.

Around the same time I read another post that, together with Mullenweg’s, got me thinking about this blog. I lost track of that post, but happily Alan Jacobs recently linked to it. It was a post by Frank Chimero that concluded in this way:

“So, I’m doubling down on my personal site in 2014. In light of the noisy, fragmented internet, I want a unified place for myself—the internet version of a quiet, cluttered cottage in the country.”

That closing metaphor makes more sense if you read the whole post, which I would recommend. You get the idea, though. Jacob’s own post also helped clarify some of the thoughts I’d been having about my online presence.

So what, then?

Like Chimero, I’m doubling down on this site in 2014.

Some of you may remember that a few months ago I commented on the relatively light posting on here throughout most of 2013. Circumstances haven’t changed all that much. I’m still too busy with a number of commitments. That said, I’m thinking of how I can weave some of that work into the life of this site, something that was only possible when I started thinking along the lines suggested by Chimero and Mullenweg.

So here is a rundown of how I’m thinking about my online presence in 2014.

A while ago I created a Facebook page for this site. There I provided links to posts, but I also linked to other articles I thought worth passing along and wrote an occasional Note. Given the way Facebook seems to be handling Pages–limiting reach to encourage people to pay to promote posts–I’m thinking of pulling the Page altogether. If it stays up, I will use it strictly to publish posts from this site for the convenience of those for whom Facebook is primary newsfeed.

My presence on Twitter is pretty low-key, and it will stay that way. While I know many smart, articulate folks that thrive on Twitter, I’ve concluded that I am not one of those people. I’ll mainly use it to provide links to posts that appear on this site and to pass on links of interest. I’m sure I’ll occasionally have a few exchanges with the aforementioned smart, articulate folks too. 

I will in all likelihood use my personal tumblr only to peruse content–mainly design, typography, art, and the like. The tumblr I created to catalog the Borg Complex will probably stay active. I have no particular problem with tumblr, except that it does encourage the tendency to be little more than a relay in the network. Other than that, dropping off of tumblr is mostly driven by the desire to consolidate my online presence.

And that is a good segue to talking about this site. In the admittedly selfish spirit of using this site in the way that most benefits me, I’m going to start including tumblr-style posts alongside the more typical posts. While the focus here will definitely remain on technology, you may start to see some other aspects of my interests and personality work their way in. You might also notice a few design tweaks to make this feel more like a personal website.

I should also take a moment to say that I’ve not done a very good job of responding to comments over the last couple of months. My apologies to those who have left comments and have not gotten a reply. I read them all, but regrettably I don’t always have time to reply. I hope that doesn’t discourage future comments, as I truly do appreciate the usually very thoughtful replies I get.

I hope all of this amounts to something that you too find useful, and if you’ve got any ideas related to any of this, I’d love to hear them.

Cheers!